This paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of nonautarkic contract in a risk sharing model with two-sided lack of commitment. Verifying the condition takes just one Guassian elimination of a matrix.
Introduction
The theory of contracting with two-sided lack of commitment has been applied to study a wide range of economic issues, including international business cycles (cf. Kehoe and Perri (2002) ), consumption inequality (cf. Kocherlakota (1996) and Ligon et al. (2002) ), and wage contracts (cf. Thomas and Worrall (1988) ). In this theory, a commonly made assumption is that some nonautarkic risk sharing arrangement is sustainable (in the sense that no one would leave the contract). To satisfy this assumption, researchers focus on sufficiently patient economic agents, in which case a Folk-theorem argument shows that nearly any allocation is sustainable. Away from this extreme, a natural question is: Under what conditions does a nonautarkic and sustainable risk sharing arrangement exist?
To answer this question, we study agents' incentives to participate in risk sharing. We linearize their utilities around autarkic endowment, which allows us to calculate in closed form the cost and the benefit of participation. Hence the condition for participation is simply that the benefit exceeds the cost. Besides answering the above question, the analysis of the linearized model provides clear economic insights on agents' incentives that are difficult to identify in the original nonlinear model.
Model
The model is similar to that in Ligon et al. (2002) . There are two agents at time zero, with preferences
where c i t (i = 1, 2) is agent i's consumption at time t, δ ∈ (0, 1) is their common discount factor, and E is the expectation operator. Both agents are risk averse, i.e., u ′′ < 0, v ′′ < 0. In each period t, agent i's income y i depends on the state of the nature s, which is drawn from a finite set {1, 2, ..., S} and follows a Markov chain. Let Π be the transition matrix [π sr ] S s,r=1 , where π sr is the transition probability from state s to state r. We assume π sr > 0 for all s and r to simplify the analysis.
A risk sharing contract specifies for each t and each history h t ≡ (s 0 , s 1 , ..., s t ) a transfer τ (h t ) to be made from agent 1 to agent 2. Transfers can be negative. Neither agent can commit; if one defaults, then both of them go to autarky (i.e., transfers are zero thereafter). Conditional on h t , the expected surplus of agent 1 over autarky is
and the surplus of agent 2, V (h t ), is defined similarly. A contract is sustainable if U (h t ) ≥ 0 and V (h t ) ≥ 0, for all h t . All contracts to be discussed in this paper are sustainable. A sustainable contract is (constrained) efficient if for any given level of agent 1's surplus it provides more surplus to agent 2 than other sustainable contracts. Ligon et al. (2002) show that, if nonautarkic contracts exist, then an efficient contract is characterized as follows. There exist {Ū s > 0} S s=1 and agent 2's surplus functions
The surplus function V s (U s ) decreases in U s and reaches zero at U s =Ū s .
A linearized problem
Following Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Ligon et al. (2002) 
Introducing
, and A r ≡ −U r , we rewrite the above as
With a slight abuse of notation, we have used
Without loss of generality, we assume that the ratio of marginal utilities ξ s weakly increases in s. Problem (3) has the following interpretation. Both agent 1 and 2 have linear utilities and their consumptions are −c s and c s , respectively. Agent 2 is subject to taste shocks {ξ s } S s=1 while agent 1 is not. Because of the taste shocks, agent 2 prefers consumption in states with high ξ s while agent 1 is indifferent. To facilitate trade, agent 2 opens a "bank account" with agent 1, in which agent 2's asset holding A s represents how much agent 1 owes agent 2. Noncommitment of agent 1 requires A s ≤ 0 (i.e., agent 2 is in debt) at all times: positive A s would obligate agent 1 to repay and trigger his default. On the other hand, although agent 2 is in debt, he would not default as long as he can still benefit from trading with agent 1. To see the benefit, interpret (4) as agent 2's budget constraint. There are two channels through which agent 2 can move consumptions from low-taste-shock states to hightaste-shock states: (1) he can reallocate assets among future states, holding more assets in high-shock states; and (2) when the current taste shock is high, agent 2 can increase his consumption through borrowing (i.e., holding less assets in the future). Calculating these benefits is the key to understanding agent 2's default decision; the following lemma does this in closed form.
Proof: That L s (A s ) is linear in A s is because agent 2's utility function is linear. To find out L s (0), note that the optimal portfolio choice in problem (3) is
and the Bellman equation is
Solving the above linear system of equations yields (5).
All elements in the matrix (I −δΠ) −1 are positive because (I −δΠ) 
A necessary and sufficient condition for nonautarkic contract
This section presents the main results of this paper. If nonautarkic contracts exist, then a necessary condition is as follows. Since the utility function v(·) is strictly concave,
or in matrix form MŪ < 0 (a vector is less than zero if all the elements are less than zero), where
Inequality (6) highlights the cost and the benefit of the long-term relationship for agent 2. Recall that L s (0) is agent 2's benefit when he holds zero assets. If his initial asset holding is A s = −Ū s in state s, then debt repayment costs him ξ sŪs units of utility. This cost must be dominated by the benefit if he participates in the contract. The above discussion shows (6) as a necessary condition for a nonautarkic contract. It turns out that (6) is also sufficient. The intuition is as follows. Under condition (6), a nonautarkic contract is sustainable with linear utilities. With nonlinear utilities u(·) and v(·), a risk sharing allocation would be sustainable if it mimics the contract with linear utilities in a small neighborhood around autarky, because u(·) and v(·) are well approximated by the linearized utilities in this neighborhood.
Theorem 1. A nonautarkic contract exists if and only if there exists {Ū s > 0}

S s=1
to satisfy (6).
Proof:
Since necessity was already shown, this proof only shows sufficiency. If {Ū s > 0} S s=1 satisfies (6), we construct a recursive nonautarkic contract as follows. In problem (1), choose agent 1's surplus as
where λ > 0 is a small number to be determined later. Choose τ s to satisfy (2), the participation constraint of agent 1. Next we verify V s (λŪ s ) ≥ 0, ∀s, the participation constraint of agent 2. If λ is small, (2) implies τ s ≈ λ
, which further
Hence for any ϵ > 0, there is a sufficiently small λ > 0 such that
Algebra similar to that of Lemma 1 shows that agent 2's surplus is larger than
Because the above vector is positive when ϵ = 0 (recall (6)), it remains positive for sufficiently small ϵ due to continuity. Therefore, agent 2's participation constraint is satisfied and the constructed nonautarkic contract is sustainable. Ligon et al. (2002) ). Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Section 20.10) , where the discount factor is 0.85 and the utilities are u(c) = v(c) =
Remark 3. Besides patience, other factors such as large variability of agents' incomes also facilitate risk sharing. To see this, consider the two-state example in
. over time and can be either 1 −ȳ orȳ ∈ (0.5, 1) with equal probability. Agent 2's income
and MŪ < 0 becomes
, then (8) is always satisfied. Inequality (7) andŪ 1 > 0 require 2.20ξ 1 − 1.20ξ 2 < 0, orȳ > 0.57. Krueger and Perri (2011) that public income insurance through progressive income taxation reduces private risk sharing.
In other words, (nonautarkic) risk sharing exists in this example if and only if agents' incomes exhibit enough variability. This result is consistent with the finding in
Although condition (6) is intuitive, it is not easily verifiable as {Ū s } S s=1 is unknown a priori. Below we relate condition (6) (i.e., MŪ < 0 for someŪ > 0) to the determinants of the principal minors of M . We begin with an illustrative example. , we focus on findingŪ 1 > 0,Ū 2 > 0 to satisfy the first two inequalities:
(10) 
A solution exists if and only if
, i.e., the determinant of
The following theorem generalizes the above conditions on determinants. Let T be the largest s such that ξ s < ξ S (i.e., ξ r = ξ S for all r > T ) and M (1 : s, 1 : s) be the principal minor of M containing the first s rows and s columns. 
Conclusion
This paper establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of nonautarkic contracts in a model where two risk-averse agents face stochastic income and cannot commit. This condition is easy to verify as it boils down to computing determinants of matrices. The analysis of linearized utilities in the paper helps us understand the tradeoffs in an agent's participation decision.
